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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. CAN A DISTRICT COURT RESCIND ITS DENIAL OF PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THEN GRANT PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THROUGH A DIFFERENT JUDGE. 
II. DO THE FACTS AND LAW JUSTIFY PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DETERMINING PLAINTIFF TO BE A STOCKHOLDER. 
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN GRANTING JUDGMENT OF $5,000 FOR 
REFUSAL TO ALLOW ACCESS TO CORPORATE -RECORDS. 
IV. DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS TO BE IN 
CONTEMPT. 
V. DID THE COURT ERR IN AWARDING AND IN THE METHOD USED TO 
DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The consideration for the issuance of shares may 
be paid, in whole or in part, in money, in other 
property, tangible or intangible, or in labor or 
services actually performed for the corporation. When 
payment of the consideration for which shares are to be 
issued shall have been received by the corporation, 
such shares shall be deemed to be fully paid and non-
assessable. 
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Neither promissory notes nor future services shall 
constitute payment or part payment, for shares of 
a corporation. 
In the absence of fraud in the transaction, judgment of 
the board of directors or shareholders, as the case may 
be, as to the value of the consideration received for 
shares shall be conclusive. 
Section 16-10-18, U.C.A. 1953. 
The initial bylaws of a corporation shall be adopted by 
its board of directors. The power to alter, amend or 
repeal the bylaws or adopt new bylaws, subject to 
repeal or change by action of the shareholders shall be 
vested in the boards of directors unless reserved to 
the shareholders by the articles of incorporation. No 
bylaws shall be adopted by the directors which shall 
require more than a majority of the voting shares for 
a quorum at a meeting of shareholders, or more than a 
majority of the votes cast to constitute action by the 
shareholders, except where higher percentages are 
required by law or by the articles of incorporation. 
The bylaws may contain any provisions for the 
regulation and management of the affairs of the 
corporation not inconsistent with law or the articles 
of incorporation. 
Section 16-19-25, U.C.A 1953. 
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of record, upon 
written demand stating the purpose thereof, shall have 
the right to examine, in person, or by agent or 
attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any 
proper purpose, its books and records of account, 
minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts 
therefrom. A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably 
related to the person's interest as a shareholder. 
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation 
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or 
his agent or attorney, so to examine and make extracts 
from its books and records of account, minutes, and 
record of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall 
be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of 
the value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in 
addition to any other damages or remedy afforded him by 
law; but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. 
Section 16-10-47(b)(c) (U.C.A. - Supplement 1985) 
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(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. 
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. Except as provided in 
subdivision (a) hereof and subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 
55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge and 
filed with the clerk. 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of 
Actions and Judgment Docket. A judgment is complete and 
shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the 
creation of a lien on real preoprty, when the same is signed 
and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall 
immediately make a notation of the judgment in the register 
of actions and the judgment docket. 
Rule 58A(b)(c) U.R.C.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A-l Tank Rental & Brine Service, Inc. was incorporated on 
June 28, 1976. The incorporators were Robert H. Williams, Lloyd 
LaDell Slaugh, Mark H. McKee, Ted McBride and Dan H. McKee. All 
of the individuals were employed with Dalbo, Inc., another Utah 
corporation. Mr. Williams and his family were the owners of 
Dalbo and the other incorporators were key employees of Dalbo. 
This group of individuals had decided that a related corporation 
providing rental of tanks, etc., could be profitable. This new 
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business was closely related to the business of Dalbo, which 
provided brine service in the oil fields around Northwestern 
Utah. 
At the time of the incorporation, Bylaws were prepared by 
the attorney for the corporation, Attorney John Beaslin. The 
Bylaws are part of the trial record at 22-36 and Brief. The 
Bylaws provided in relevant part: 
It is hereby agreed by and between the five 
principal stockholders that all of the stockholders 
will remain as employees of Dalbo, Inc. for a period of 
three (3) years commencing October 1, 1975, in order to 
retain their stock positions in this corporation. If 
any of the*stockholders leave the employment of Dalbo, 
Inc. before the end of the three-year period, then each 
of the parties shall receive a return of their invest-
ment plus interest at the rate of Ten percent (10%) per 
annum from the time of contribution, which was October 
1, 1975. 
Lloyd LaDell Slaugh, Mark H. McKee, Dan H. McKee and Ted 
McBride each contributed the sum of $11,877.50 to the 
corporation. Williams contributed a brine plant which was agreed 
to be attributable to 51% of the assets of the corporation. 
The stock was divided 12.25% each to Lloyd LaDell Slaugh, Mark 
H. McKee, Dan H. McKee and Ted McBride. Robert Williams received 
51% of the stock. The bylaws were prepared for signature by each 
of the parties, however it is undisputed that the bylaws were not 
signed. However, it is also undisputed before the court that the 
Bylaws were agreed to by all of the stockholders. See Affidavit 
of Lloyd LaDell Slaugh and Mark H. McKee, paragraph 3, 4 and 5, 
Trial Record at 67-69 and Appendix to Brief. It is also undis-
puted that the Plaintiff Dan H. McKee voluntarily left the 
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employment of Dalbo, Inc., before the completion of three years. 
Prior to that permanent termination, he had also taken a volun-
tary leave of absence for several months. Id at paragraph 
Thereafter, the Plaintiff received back his contribution of 
$11,877.50, together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum 
from the date of his monetary contribution to A-1 Tank Rental & 
Brine Service pursuant to the bylaws. Id. There is no evidence 
that the Plaintiff ever requested a stock certificate be given to 
him or in any way acted or purported to act as a stockholder 
prior to institution of the litigation herein, a period of 
approximately three (3) years from the date he left the 
corporation. 
On January 4, 1982, Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he 
was a stockholder in the Defendant A-1 Tank Rental and Brine 
Service, Inc. and that the Defendants were refusing to issue him 
a stock certificate for the shares he owed. Plaintiff also 
requested monetary relief for activities which the corporation 
had engaged in which would violate his rights as a stockholder, 
were he determined to be a stockholder. 
The Defendants appeared and answered the Complaint denying 
that Plaintiff was a stockholder in the corporation. The 
Answer specifically noted that the bylaws were drafted and were 
agreed to and that based thereon Plaintiff was not a stockholder 
as he had failed to work the requisite time. The Answer further 
noted that the Plaintiff had received the return of his 
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investment together with interest at 10% pursuant to the 
stockholder agreement. 
After some minimal discovery, the Plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment alleging that the corporation and 
Defendants were attempting to forfeit his stock certificate and 
asking for determination that he was a stockholder. The Defend-
ants responded asking the court to deny Plaintiff's Motion and at 
that time filed the Affidavit of Lloyd LaDell Slaugh and Mark 
H. McKee previously referred to, a copy of which is located in 
the Appendix. Prior to this time, Robert H. Williams had also 
answered Plaintiff's Interrogatories. See Trial Record at 48-51 
and Appendix to Brief. In relevant part, that answer to interro-
gatories was as follows: 
1. Attached to the Defendants1 Answer was a set of 
alleged Bylaws of the corporation. However, those Bylaws 
were not signed. Please state whether the Plaintiff ever 
signed those Bylaws, and if so the date and also state 
whether any of the other Defendants signed the Bylaws and if 
so the date. If the Bylaws have been adopted, please state 
the date of the meeting at which they were adopted, the 
place of the meeting and all parties present and the vote 
that was taken in adopting the Bylaws. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff did not sign the Bylaws attached to 
the Defendants1 Answer but they were prepared and discussed 
by all of the shareholders in the corporation and agreed to 
by them even though not signed. The Bylaws apparently were 
not formally adopted by the Board but were in the possession 
of the corporation shortly after organized. 
Thus, at the time of making the decision on the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the court had the Complaint 
and Answer, Answers to Interrogatories, a copy of the Bylaws and 
Articles of Incorporation and the Affidavit of Lloyd LaDell 
Slaugh and Mark H. McKee. Judge Ballif denied the Motion 
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for Summary Judgment in a ruling dated October 14, 1982. See 
Minute Entry on Trial Record at 84 and Appendix to Brief. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff made Motion to the court to reconsider its 
denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Trial 
Record at 80-83 and Appendix to Brief. The Defendants responded 
asking the court not to reconsider the denial of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and realleging that the denial was the correct 
conclusion. Subsequent to the denial of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and approximately three months later, Judge Ballif 
entered a new ruling stating that the rules of procedure do not 
recognize a Motion for Reconsider but because the case would be 
transferred to a Judge in the Seventh District, the court would 
rescind its denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment, referring 
the matter to Judge Davidson for his reconsideration. Trial 
Record at 85 and Appendix to Brief. 
It should be noted that in fact the matter had been 
transferred to Judge Davidson by December 6, 1982, after the 
Motion for Reconsideration had been made. Evidently, Judge 
Davidson then referred the matter back to Judge Ballif who 
rescinded his ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment and then 
the matter was again referred back to Judge Davidson. See Trial 
Record at 89. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was then resubmitted to 
Judge Davidson with the same affidavits and legal memorandum as 
had previously been given to Judge Ballif. The court after 
considering those entered its Memorandum Decision granting 
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Partial Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff. Trial Record at 109 
and 110 and Appendix to Brief. The court based its decision on 
the fact that the Bylaws had not been signed and that while no 
stock had been issued, Plaintiff was entitled to the issuance and 
therefore he was a stockholder. Given that determination, the 
court found the issue to be whether or not the corporation 
thereafter could forfeit his stockholder interest. The court 
found that a Bylaw could not work a forfeiture of stock unless 
the authority was given in the corporate charter or by statute. 
There being no claim of such authority, the court ruled as a 
matter of law that the Plaintiff remained a stockholder in the 
Defendant corporation. This Memorandum Decision was rendered on 
May 26, 1983. An Order implementing the Memorandum Decision was 
signed on June 15, 1983. See Trial Record at 121 and 122 
and Appendix to Brief. On July 13, 1983, the Defendants filed a 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal with the Supreme Court with 
respect to the Partial Summary Judgment previously granted. 
See Trial Record at 127-29. 
Shortly before that effort to obtain interlocutory relief, 
the Plaintiff mailed a letter to Defendant's Attorney dated June 
30, 1983 requesting documents be provided by July 15, 1983. See 
Trial Record at 124-25 and Appendix to Brief. The Petition 
for Interlocutory Appeal was denied on August 2, 1983. 
On February 3, 1984, Judge Davidson entered an Order to the 
Defendants requiring them to appear on March 27, 1984 at 10:00 
a.m. to show cause why they should not be found in contempt for 
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their failure to create and deliver a stock certificate to the 
Plaintiff pursuant to the Partial Summary Judgment previously 
entered. See Trial Record at 180. 
On March 27, 1984, the Defendants and their counsel appeared 
and indicated a willingness to provide the stock certificate or 
file a Supercedeas Bond if the court would enter it's Order as a 
Judgment so that Defendants would have the right to file a 
Supercedeas Bond. See Trial Record at 202. The court indicated 
that it was not required to docket its Partial Summary Judgment 
before requiring, the Defendants to create and deliver the stock 
certificate to Plaintiff. The Defendants resisted, arguing that 
they had the right to post a Supercedeas Bond prior to delivery 
of the stock certificate and that they were entitled to a hearing 
on such prior to delivery and further that the court had not 
docketed the judgment so as to allow them to obtain a Supercedeas 
Bond with respect to the stock certificate. 
The court indicated that if the stock certificate were not 
delivered to the Plaintiff by the next morning, that Defendants 
would be imprisoned in the Uintah County Jail. Thereafter, after 
further discussion, the court changed it's position and agreed 
that the stock certificate would not be given to the Plaintiff 
until a final decision was made in this case, including appeals. 
Based on that agreement, a stock certificate was immediately 
delivered by the Defendants to the court, the court then pro-
ceeded to enter a judgment against the Defendants for civil 
contempt in the amount of $671.50 and $22.50 as and for attorneys 
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fees incurred in the matter. See Trial Record at 204 - 206. 
On May 29, 1984 the Plaintiff amended its Complaint to 
include a derivative cause of action against the individual 
Defendants. Defendants entered an Answer to the Amended Com-
plaint denying specifically that a derivative action was proper 
under the circumstances involved because the only other stock-
holder other than the Defendants was the Plaintiff and that the 
prerequisites for derivative action had been completed. 
The Amended Complaint requested relief on a number of new 
causes of action* The first cause of action was that Plaintiff 
was entitled to 10% of the value of the shares owned by each 
shareholder, including attorneys fees, costs and damages pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-47. The second cause of 
action was for dissolution of the corporation because of the 
Defendants refusal to acknowledge the Plaintiff as a stockholder, 
pay dividends to Defendant and otherwise treat the Plaintiff as a 
stockholder. The third cause of action was that the Defendants 
had breached their fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff because they 
had paid themselves dividends and salaries and had acted 
maliciously and intentionally in that regard. The fourth cause 
of action was for deriviative claims of the corporation alleging 
that the individual Defendants had breached their duty to the 
corporation by using corporate funds, assets and credit to assist 
them personally. Defendants appeared and denied all of the 
allegations of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
Trial by jury commenced on October 24, 1984, Judge Richard 
11 
C. Davidson presiding. It should be noted that the court had 
already determined that Plaintiff was a stockholder so the jury 
issues were limited to the claims set forth in the Amended 
Complaint relating to damages to the corporation and to the 
Plaintiff as a result of Defendants conduct of the corporation, 
given the fact the Plaintiff was shown to be a stockholder. The 
trial lasted four days, concluding on October 27, 1984. 
The jury was given eight special interrogatories and 
numerous instructions. The interrogatories and the answers given 
by the jury are as follows: 
1. Do you find that any of the Defendants have refused to 
allow Plaintiff, his agents or attorneys, to examine 
the books of A-l Tank Rental & Brine Service, Inc.? 
Yes. 
2. Do you find that part of the payment made to the 
individual Defendants were dividends or gifts? Yes. 
If yes, how much in total? $1,000,000 (in total to all 
shareholders). 
3. Do you find that the corporate assets have been 
misapplied or wasted? No. 
4. Do you find that the acts of the directors or those in 
control of the corporation are illegal or oppressive? 
Yes. 
5. Do you find that A-l Tank Rental & Brine Service, Inc., 
loaned corporate moneys to the individual Defendants 
without authorization from its shareholders to purchase 
the Richens property? Yes. If the answer is yes, has 
A-l the corporation been damaged, and if so, how 
much? $81,556. 
6. Do you find that the persons controlling A-l Tank 
Rental & Brine Service, Inc., have paid themselves 
unreasonable compensation? No. If yes, how much in 
total? $0 
7. Do you find that the individual Defendants have 
violated their fiduciary duty to the corporation 
thereby benefiting themselves at the expenses of the 
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corporation? Yes, If yes, in what total amount? $0_ 
8. Do you find Plaintiff's legal action has conferred a 
benefit on the corporation? Yes. (Unable to determine 
monetary value.) 
Trial Record at 848-850. 
The jury was duly instructed and numerous objections were 
filed by Defendants to the form of the instructions and the 
form of the verdict. Trial Transcript at 819-835, 
837-847. These objections included the failure to divide the 
questions as to the individual Defendants. Trial Transcript at 
832. 
On January 8, 1985, the court, interpreting the jury 
verdict entered judgment against the Defendant A-1 Tank Rental & 
Brine Service, Inc. in the amount of $5,000.00 as a penalty for 
failure to produce records pursuant to Plaintiff's letter dated 
June 30, 1983. The court reserved for further hearing the amount 
of attorneys fees to be awarded to the Plaintiff as well as the 
remedies it would impose based upon Jury Verdict Answer. 
Attorney for the Plaintiff entered a Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements dated February 27, 1985. Trial Record at 485 and 
487. Defendants moved to strike the bill of costs as not being 
in accordance with the costs as determined pursuant to Utah law. 
Pursuant to court order, an evidentiary hearing was held 
with respect to attorneys fees on March 5, 1985. After argument 
and evidence with respect to attorneys fees, the court awarded 
the Plaintiff 68% of the attorneys fees and costs testifed to. 
Transcript of March 5, 1985 at 36-37. The court based this 
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percentage on the fact that the Plaintiff received judgments of 
25,000 as a statutory penalty for failure to allow examination of 
records, $13,958.86 as his portion of dividends which were be 
paid other stockholders. The court disregarded any value or 
attorney time achieved in proving that Plaintiff was indeed a 
stockholder. The court then determined 68% by mathematically 
dividing sum of $18,958.86 awarded to the Plaintiff by $81,556.00 
awarded to the corporation. This $81,556.00 judgment is where 
the jury found that the individual Defendants had improperly 
loaned themselves money of the corporation to purchase property 
for a new site for the corporation. $81,556.00 was a judgment of 
the corporation against the four individual Defendants. The 
court in determining the amount of attorneys fees simply took the 
ratio between the $13,958.86 plus the $5,000.00 and the 
$81,556.00. 
The court did not consider the fact that Plaintiff used a 
substantial amount of his attorney time proving that he was a 
stockholder and also obtaining the remedy of causing the 
corporation to buy him out as a minority stockholder for 
$50,000.00. The court did not consider nor require Plaintiff's 
counsel to allocate its time between the various causes of action 
when it was serving the benefits of the Plaintiff as opposed to 
purportedly benefiting of the corporate Defendant. There was 
no request nor any effort whatsoever to allocate time between the 
various causes of action despite Plaintiff's demand, therefore, 
the court simply granted its relief on this mathematical basis. 
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Thereafter, in determining what relief would be ordered 
based on the fact that the Defendants had treated the Plaintiff 
improperly as a stockholder, the court ordered that the 
corporation be sold to the highest bidder. The highest bidder 
were the Defendants who purchased the corporation and thereafter 
satisfied the corporate judgment against themselves. 
Because the Defendants have purchased the corporation, that 
issue is now resolved and there is no issue on appeal involving 
the derivative claims of the corporation, except as to attorneys 
fees therefore, >as all parties acknowledge that the Defendants 
are now the sole stockholders of the corporation. The Defendants 
have chosen for business reasons not to appeal a number of the 
jury determinations based upon the Partial Summary Judgment. The 
consequence of the Defendants selective appeal of this matter is 
to allow the jury verdict to stand in significant part if the 
Partial Summary Judgment is not reversed by this Court. However, 
in addition to appealing the Partial Summary Judgment, the 
Defendants have also appealed the award of $5,000.00 for refusal 
to examine records, the awarding of attorneys fees and the 
Judgment of Contempt leading to a Judgment in the amount of 
$874.10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. A DISTRICT COURT CANNOT RESCIND ITS DENIAL OF 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THEN GRANT 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THROUGH A DIFFERENT 
JUDGE. 
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The court erred in allowing a reconsideration of the 
motion for Partial Summary Judgment, where there were no 
additional facts or legal arguments advanced. There is no such 
thing as Motion for Reconsideration. 
II. THE FACTS AND LAW DO NOT JUSTIFY PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DETERMINING PLAINTIFF TO BE A STOCKHOLDER. 
The court erred in catagorizing the issue as one of the 
stock forfeiture. The arrangement was simply a stockholder 
buy-sell agreement and/or condition to obtaining the stock. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT OF $5,000 FOR 
REFUSAL TO ALLOW ACCESS TO CORPORATE RECORDS. 
There is simply no evidence that the Defendants refused 
access to corporate records. The form of Plaintiff's request was 
improper as there is no duty to provide records, but only to 
allow examination on site. The intervening interlocutory appeal 
explains both the Plaintiff and Defendants failure to make any 
effort to examine records in connection with the June 30, 1983 
request. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS TO BE IN 
CONTEMPT. 
The court erred in finding Defendants to be in contempt for 
it was proceeding itself improperly by failure to docket the 
judgment and allow a Supercedeas Bond hearing. The switch by the 
court in its order and then the prompt compliance by Defendants 
negates any contempt. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING AND IN THE METHOD USED 
TO DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The court erred in allowing derivative claims based on a 
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complete failure to follow the prerequisites. The monetary 
calculation of amount ignored the other relief obtained by the 
Plaintiff and itself was irregular. The Plaintiff's attorney 
should have been required at minimum to segregate their time. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DISTRICT COURT CANNOT RESCIND ITS DENIAL OF PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THEN GRANT PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THROUGH A DIFFERENT JUDGE. 
A careful review of the Trial Record prior to Judge 
Davidson's Memorandum Decision dated May 26, 1983, clearly 
reveals that Plaintiff was granted a Motion to Reconsider. 
On July 23, 1982, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Trial Record at 63. The parties filed their 
Memorandums supporting and in opposition to the Motion. On 
October 14, 1982, Judge Ballif filed a minute entry denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Trial Record 
at 184 and Appendix to Brief. Copies of the minute entry were 
sent to attorneys for the parties. The minute entry requested no 
order be filed nor is it required that a formal order be prepared 
when a Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Thirteen days 
after Judge Ballif' s minute entry was filed, the Plaintiff filed 
a Motion to Reconsider Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Trial Record at 80. Judge Ballif took no action on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. Judge Davidson, having 
been referred the case, requested that Judge Ballif decide the 
Motion to Reconsider, which request was made in a letter dated 
December 6, 1982. Trial Record at 89. In the letter to Judge 
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Ballif of December 6, 1982, Judge Davidson specifically requests 
that Judge Ballif "make a ruling on the latest motion". The 
latest motion of course was the Motion to Reconsider. Then, on 
January 4, 1983, some 2 1/2 months after Judge Ballif in a minute 
entry denied Plaintiff1s Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge 
Ballif, apparently at the request of Judge Davidson, entered a 
ruling which rescinded his denial of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment of October 14, 1982. Trial Record at 
85 and Appendix to Brief. 
Although Judge Ballif, in his ruling of January 4, 1983, 
recognizes that a Motion for Reconsideration is inappropriate, he 
in essence does reconsider and rescind his earlier decision 
denying the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Judge Ballif 
appeared to justify his action by stating in that ruling that 
"The court deems it appropriate to avoid the limit 
ations such a ruling will place on the court hearing 
the matter on its merits and therefore elects to 
rescind the ruling of the court dated October 
14, 1982. . . ". 
Trial Record at 85. 
Clearly, a denial of a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would 
create no limitations on a second Judge who would hear the 
matter. Nevertheless, some seven months before, Judge Davidson 
reconsidered the same Motion, without any additional Memorandum, 
Affidavits, or additional evidence, and granted Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Trial Record at 109-110. 
After the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was granted, 
Defendants petitioned for consideration of an interlocutory 
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appeal to this court, which petition was denied. 
It seems clear that a Motion to Reconsider, by any other 
name, is still a Motion to Reconsider. Judge Ballif denied 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on October 14, 
1982. When Plaintiff filed his Motion to Reconsider, Judge 
Ballif rightly ignored that Motion, upon the request of Judge 
Davidson, Judge Ballif ruled on the Motion by rescinding his 
denial, Judge Davidson, seven months later reversed Judge 
Ballif1s original denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment* 
In Peay v. Peay, 602 P.2d 841 (Utah, 1980) this court 
recognized the problems created by Motions for Reconsideration 
and a party's right to rely on the finality of a court 
decision. The Court said: 
,f
...[T]he new rules of procedure . . . were designed to 
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the 
parties and the courts could file and rely upon 
. . . in order to avoid such a state of indecision for 
both the judge and the parties, the practical 
expediency demands that there be some finality to the 
actions of the court; and he should not be in the 
position of having the further duty of acting as a 
court of review upon his own ruling." Id. at 843. 
In the case at Bar, not only was Judge Ballif acting as a 
court of review upon his own ruling, Judge Davidson also acted as 
a court of review. 
Although it may not be inappropriate under the Rules of 
Civil Procedure for a party to refile a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, if such is done, it should only be done based 
on further evidence in the form of Memorandum and Affidavits to 
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support the Motion. In this case, the underlying facts make it 
clear that the actions of the lower court with respect to the 
granting of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
nothing short of a granting of Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider 
and ultimately a reversal of the ruling which was the basis of 
such Motion to Reconsider. This Court and the Rules of Civil 
Procedure have clearly and consistently established that such 
an action is erroneous and warrants reversal. 
This case warrants reversal on this point especially given 
the historical reluctance to grant Summary Judgment if there is 
any doubt as to whether issues of material fact remain to be 
decided. Clearly, if the issues which were foreclosed by the 
lower court's reversal and granting of Partial Summary Judgment 
were to be heard at trial on the merits, it would not be 
prejudicial to the Plaintiff and would in fact favor the policies 
of this Court. The Defendants are also entitled to a pattern of 
regularity of procedure and to rely upon some finality to the 
actions of courts* 
II. THE FACTS AND LAW DO NOT JUSTIFY PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DETERMINING PLAINTIFF TO BE A STOCKHOLDER. 
The substantive basis of this appeal relates to the court's 
granting of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment determining 
Plaintiff to be a stockholder. Defendants have previously noted 
the manner in which that Partial Summary Judgment was granted and 
noted the error inherent therein. However, this argument 
involves the substance of the court's ruling. 
20 
In order to evaluate whether Partial Summary Judgment was 
proper, it is imperative to evaluate what evidence was before the 
court at the time the Motion was granted. A significant body of 
evidence was presented to the court during the later trial 
which involved the relationship between the parties. However, it 
would be improper to use that information as it was merely 
collateral to the other issues and neither party could be 
charged with fully addressing the earlier issue which had been 
decided. 
The court had on file the unsworn Complaint of the Plaintiff 
and the unsworn Answer of the Defendants which had attached to it 
a copy of the Bylaws. Subsequent to the Complaint and Answer, 
Defendants answered a set of Plaintiff's Interrogatories. These 
Answers were signed by Robert H. William, President of A-l Tank 
Rental & Brine Service, Inc. Based on the Complaint, Answer, 
Answers to Interrogatories and a copy of the Articles of Incor-
poration and Bylaws, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Trial Record at 57, et. seq. This is the sum of the 
evidence that was presented on behalf of the Plaintiff in asking 
for a ruling in its favor. The Defendants responded with an 
Affidavit signed by Lloyd LaDell Slaugh and Mark McKee. No other 
evidence was properly before the court and, of course, a number 
of the allegations stated in the Complaint and Answer would be 
improperly used as they are unsworn. Based on this evidence and 
none other, the court granted Partial Summary Judgment in favor 
of the Plaintiff determining him to be a stockholder. 
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A careful reading of the court's Memorandum Decision and the 
subsequent Order based thereon indicates its basis. The court 
found that neither the Articles of Incorporation nor Utah 
statutes allowed a forfeiture of stock and based thereon the 
Plaintiff had to be and remained a stockholder. It is important 
to note that in reaching this legal conclusion, the court 
determined and indeed this is the whole center of its ruling, 
that what was involved was a forfeiture of Plaintiff's stock 
ownership. 
In this instance, the court has determined the issue by 
categorizing the nature of the relationships between the 
parties. By determining that the issue was one of whether an 
individual's stock could be forfeited, the ruling then became 
obvious. Stock forfeiture is disfavored and only the very 
strongest wording would permit such a thing. Forfeitures in any 
form are disfavored by the law and in equity. The nature of a 
forfeiture is that one loses an interest entirely; he loses that 
which he once had. The idea of forfeiting one's stock ownership 
in a corporation is obviously going to be disfavored and once the 
issue is tagged as being of that nature, the obvious occurs. 
The Defendants bring this appeal because they believe it was 
not a forfeiture, but merely an agreement between the stock-
holders to buy out their respective stock interests under certain 
circumstances. That is, it was not a forfeiture between the 
parties, it was an agreement of sale, an option to purchase, a 
buy-out agreement amongst stockholders. Each of the minority 
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stockholders, when the corporation was formed, were employees of 
Dalbo which was engaged in a related oil field business. That 
corporation was owned by Robert H. Williams and his family, A-l 
Tank Rental & Brine Service, Inc. was to be an allied corporation 
which would complement Dalbo. Mr. Williams as the owner of 
Dalbo, decided to form the new corporation with his key employess 
in Dalbo. Those individuals include the Plaintiff in this 
case. It was agreed that Bob Williams and his company, Dalbo, 
would use their credit to buy the various equipment that would be 
needed to get A-l Tank Rental running and indeed he put up the 
iDrine plant as his share of the original corporation. But that 
understates his contribution because of his continuing provision 
of large amounts of credit for the fledgling corporation and his 
ability to use portions of the Dalbo yard and equipment to 
benefit it. Each of the minority stockholders put up a small sum 
in cash, $11,870.00. The Plaintiff, as one of these employees, 
put up that sum of money. 
They agreed between themselves that if any person didn't 
remain employed with Dalbo for three years he would sell or 
relinquish his stock ownership in the new corporation in return 
for repayment of his entire contribution plus interest at 10%. 
What this meant was that if Dan McKee or Mark McKee or any of the 
minority stockholders were to leave the employment of Dalbo, they 
would be paid their original contribution plus interest at 10% 
for their stock. It should be noted that a person contributing 
money to a corporation doesn't have that right to have that money 
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returned except under certain conditions. In this case, it was 
agreed that there was this buy-out for each of them. That is, if 
they left Dalbo that was what had to be paid to them. If Bob 
Williams had left, he would have received back his brine plant, 
plus interest on its value at 10% from the time he contributed 
it. It is obvious that it wouldn't be likely that he would leave 
the employ of Dalbo because he was the owner, but nevertheless, 
ne was an employee of that corporation. It should be noted that 
the two businesses were related and in working for Dalbo they 
were also working for A-l Tank Rental. The businesses were 
intertwined. 
What is occurring is that a group of five stockholders 
got together and agreed that all of them would work to make 
the new corporation go through their relationship with Dalbo 
which was interrelated in the oil field business to A-l Tank 
Rental. Dalbo provides fluids in the tank business and A-l 
provides the tanks that hold these fluids. Admittedly, Dalbo 
provides fluids that do not go in A-l tanks and A-l Tank rents 
items that do not hold Dalbo fluids, but the majority of the 
business of the two companies was and is interrelated. 
Each stockholder is assured that if he leaves the employment 
of Dalbo that he won1t be left as a mere minority stockholder, 
but will be paid the amount of his contribution plus interest at 
10%. There is no prohibition or restriction on a stockholder 
making such an agreement. Indeed, these kinds of agreements are 
logical in a close corporation. A buy-out agreement of this 
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nature is common in small corporations and close corporations 
and indeed is looked on with great favor by people advising small 
corporations. 
The error of the court was categorizing this relationship as 
being a forfeiture. It isn1t a forfeiture if one receives back 
his original contribution plus interest at 10%. That is simply a 
buy-out of his stockholder ownership conditioned on employment. 
If employment ceases the stockholder agrees to the buy-out 
arrangement. The evidence is that Plaintiff knew what this 
arrangement was. and agreed to it when he entered into this 
corporation. 
The treatises note and discuss similar arrangements: 
Generally, the provision of a Bylaw, the Articles of 
Incorporation, or the stock certificate requiring a stock-
holder before selling his stock to afford the corporation or 
other stockholders an opportunity to purchase it, sometimes 
referred to as a first refusal option, or a buy-sell 
agreement, is valid and binding upon the stockholder, either 
as a regulation within the powers of the corporation or as 
a contract obligation voluntarily undertaken by the 
stockholder, provided that the Bylaw is reasonable and does 
not conflict with the statute. Indeed, such an option is 
the most popular and frequent restriction on the transfer of 
shares, because it is considered the most servicable and 
fairest type of restraint and also because of its universal 
acceptance as to its legal validity. 
18 AmJur 2d, Section 690 at 566-567. 
In this case, not only was the buy-out agreement between the 
stockholders an oral agreement, it was also a clear provision in 
the written Bylaws of the corporation. 
It has been noted that the other stockholders who remained 
with the corporation also received a return of their contrib-
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ution. While that may be the case, it says nothing about 
the specific Duy-out arrangement involving the Plaintiff. 
Indeed, the Defendants have received various dividends and 
significant other returns beyond that that which was given to the 
Plaintiff. This is simply a result of their staying with the 
corporation. 
The critical issue is whether this agreement is "pigeon 
holed11 as a forfeiture or as a stockholder agreement enabling a 
buy-sell between the parties. It is the Defendants1 position 
that the document is clearly a buy-sell agreement and had nothing 
to do with forfeiture whatsoever. Forfeiture is a situation 
where one loses his interest and receives nothing in return. 
However, in this case, the only things which the Plaintiff 
contributed to the corporation was his payment to the corporation 
in the form of an initial contribution and his employment with 
the corporation to enable it to be a success. When that employ-
ment was terminated within the three (3) year period, that 
Plaintiff received back his original contribution with interest. 
It should also be noted that it was the Plaintiff and not the 
Defendants which elected to terminate Plaintiff's employment. A 
review of the most common form books set up numerous buy-sell 
agreements based on the condition of employment. See i.e., 6A 
AmJur Legal Ford 2d, Corporations, Section 74:1997-2004. Therein 
there are numerous form agreements providing for a disposition of 
shares upon the termination of employment. The parties 
anticipated one of them might terminate his employment during the 
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critical initial period required for this corporation. The 
provision is reasonable, fair and appropriate. 
In recognition of this agreement the stock was not issued 
during the three year period. None of the parties, neither Bob 
Williams nor any of the minority stockholders received their 
stock certificates until after the three year period was up. All 
of them recognized that the employment period was a condition 
prerequisite to receiving the stock certificate pursuant to their 
stockholder agreement. The fact that Plaintiff did not have 
possession of the certificate is evidence of the fact that each 
acknowledged the stockholder agreement. The record is devoid of 
any evidence that the Plaintiff ever requested the stock certif-
icate during the three years, indeed he did not request the stock 
certificate for almost three years after he left the corporation 
and only on or about the time this litigation was commenced. 
This was after the Plaintiff had received back all of his 
contribution plus interest. Clearly, this behaviour on the 
Plaintiff's part is inconsistent with his allegations and 
entirely consistent: with the position of the Defendants. 
It should be noted that this argument does not rely on facts 
yet to be adduced. However, there are facts which could assist 
in the determination regarding the nature of this clause, whether 
it be a forfeiture clause or a stockholder buy-sell agreement. 
That is beyond this Court at this point but taken as a whole the 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should have been denied and 
once denied should not have been changed. 
27 
It should be noted that if we are dealing with a 
stockholders agreement, it need not be in the Articles of 
Incorporation and it need not be in the Bylaws. In fact, it can 
simply be an oral agreement between the parties, especially if 
there is evidence of tangible performance and reliance that 
supports the evidentiary allegation of an oral agreement. In 
this case there is the presence of a written document setting 
forth the terms of the arrangement and oral testimony saying that 
it was agreed to although unsigned, supported by non-delivery of 
stock certificates in aid thereof. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT OF $5,000 FOR 
REFUSAL TO ALLOW ACCESS TO CORPORATE RECORDS. 
On May 26, 1983, the court rendered a Memorandum Decision 
granting Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
determining that the Plaintiff was a stockholder. See Trial 
Record at 109-110, 130-131. After the Memorandum Decision had 
been placed in Order form, the attorneys for Plaintiff wrote a 
letter to John C. Beaslin, the attorney of record representing 
Defendants on June 30, 1983. Trial Record at 150-151 and 
Appendix to Brief. The June 30, 1983 letter requests that within 
fifteen (15) days, that the books, records of accounts, minutes, 
and other corporate records be provided for examination and 
copying by Mr. McKee and his accountant. Id. The letter also 
refers to Utah Code Section 16-10-47 and refers to the penalty 
therein. On July 13, 1983 the Defendants filed a Request for 
Interlocutory Appeal. The interlocutory appeal on the Partial 
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Summary Judgment was denied on August 2, 1983. 
A year and a half later the court in rendering a judgment of 
the jury verdict determined that it would be improper to impose 
the penalty set forth in Section 16-10-47 to any letters or 
Motions prior to the date the court determined the Plaintiff to 
De a stockholder. The only request subsequent to the court order 
determining the Plaintiff to be a stockholder was the letter of 
June 30, 1983. For this reason, the court determined that it 
would award a judgment based on the failure to respond to the 
letter of June 30, 1983 of $5,000.00. 
A number of issues should be noted with respect to this 
trial court determination. Initially, it should be noted that 
the jury was not properly instructed that the relevant refusal 
was the failure to provide records pursuant to the letter 
dated on June 30, 1983. It would be impossible to determine 
whether the juryfs determination that there had been a refusal to 
provide access to corporate records was based on the June 30, 
1983 letter or one of the many other instances that the Plaintiff 
alleged he was denied access to the records. Thus, it appears 
that the trial court is basing its entry of the judgment on a 
jury determination which may not be based on the same incident at 
all. This was duly noted in the various objections to the jury 
verdict form and in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss this portion of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. See Trial Record at 837-838. Defendants1 
counsel specifically noted in its motion that there needed to be 
an intent to deny a person access and that could only be proved 
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arter the Partial Summary Judgment was granted and after the 
Supreme Court had denied an interlocutory appeal. Id. 
The initial issue is whether a trial court having given 
a jury a number of instances on which they could determine a 
failure to produce records, then subsequent to the rendering of 
trie jury decision eliminate all but a single incident and enter 
judgment based on that incident. 
Another issue is whether the framers of the statute intended 
ir ro be applied in a situation such as this, where there is 
Irrigation between the parties with respect to whether or not an 
individual even is a stockholder. Clearly, there was a dispute 
between the parties over whether or not the Plaintiff was a 
stockholder. Under these circumstances, it is not appropriate to 
cnarge the Defendant with a $5,000.00 penalty while there is 
Irrigation or appeals over whether the individual is indeed a 
stockholder. It would be the Defendants1 suggestion that a 
proper reading of the statute and the intent behind the statute 
rs rhat it would only apply to a situation where a person is 
enrolled as a stockholder and has a stock certificate. In the 
t-isrant matter, the Plaintiff did not have a stock certificate. 
Clearly, the Plaintiff's counsel could have proceeded with a 
Eacuest for Production under the normal rules of discovery rather 
tran through the letter format. It is the Defendants' position 
rhar the statute is not applicable to the incident here, especi-
ally when the very issue of the existence of a stockholder 
relationship is on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
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Another issue which is involved in the specific letter of 
June 30, 1983, is whether there was a denial as contemplated by 
the statute. There is no evidence in the record whatsoever that 
there was any response to the June 30, 1983, letter* That is, 
neither Plaintiff nor his attorneys nor his accountant nor any 
agent appeared at the offices of the corporation to examine the 
records or to copy them or to proceed in any way with them. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that there was in response to 
that letter any refusal by mail or orally of a right to come and 
examine the records. The record simply reflects no response to 
the letter by the Defendants. Furthermore, that the Plaintiff 
did not appear for an examination. 
A careful reading of the letter indicates that it is unclear 
as to exactly what the Plaintiff's attorney intended. Did he 
intend that the books, records of accounts, minutes and corporate 
records would be given to him at his law office, at the home of 
the Plaintiff, or that they would be examined on site? If the 
letter is a suggestion that a corporation is obligated to take 
the bulk of its corporate records and deliver them to a 
stockholder or to the stockholder's attorney, that would 
certainly be beyond the bounds of what the statute contemplates. 
Clearly, the statute contemplates a situation where the stock-
holder comes to the corporate office to examine the records. In 
this case, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Plaintiff 
came to the corporate office or attempted in any way to examine 
the records on site. There is absolutely no evidence in the 
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record anywhere that there was any refusal to provide the 
records* There was no evidence in the trial and there is no 
document anywhere that indicates any response or activity by 
either party subsequent to the letter• 
Of course, viewed in the factual relationship between the 
parties, it is obvious why there is no further effort to examine 
the records on site. The Defendants filed a Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court during this 
fifteen (15) day period. As a result of this, both parties were 
waiting to see what the ruling of the Supreme Court was with 
respect to the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. Given this 
factual circumstance, neither party pushed either for the 
examination of the records, nor was there any refusal to provide 
them. 
Under all these facts with respect to this specific 
incident, the Defendant does not believe there are the necessary 
findings to justify an award of $5,000.00 against the corporate 
Defendant for a refusal to allow Plaintiff to make an examination 
of corporate records. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFENDANTS TO BE IN 
CONTEMPT. 
On April 12, 1284 the court entered an Order finding the 
Defendants to be in contempt and awarding the sum of $694.00 as 
and for attorneys fees and costs as a result thereof. 
The only issue relevant to the contempt order on appeal is 
that amount awarded as attorneys fees. The issues involved in 
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the Order finding Defendants in contempt were that the court had 
ordered the Defendants to deliver a stock certificate to the 
Plaintiff representing his shares based on the Partial Summary 
Judgment• The Defendants and their counsel resisted complying 
with that Order for two reasons. Both of these reasons were 
presented to the court at the time of the hearing. The reasons 
were first that the court had not entered its Order as required 
by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 58A(b)(c). That is, the 
Order requiring delivery of the stock certificate had not been 
docketed as a . Judgment against the corporation and the 
Defendants1 position was that they did not have to comply until 
it was docketed. 
The second reason is related to the first in that Defendants 
did not wish to deliver the stock certificate until such time as 
they had an appellate determination that the Partial Summary 
Judgment was correct. It should be noted that the Defendants had 
previously filed a petition for interlocutory appeal to this 
Court, the same having been denied. The Defendants1 position was 
that they had the right to file a Supercedeas Bond and withhold 
delivery of the stock certificate until such time as they could 
obtain an appeal from the final judgment which would include the 
ruling involving the Partial Summary Judgment entitling Plaintiff 
to the stock certificate. 
The trial court's position was that it had entered an Order, 
that the Defendants knew of the Order and were bound to obey the 
Order and that a hearing regarding a Supercedeas Bond was not 
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applicable to its Order that the stock certificate be delivered. 
The issue presented was simply whether or not the Defendants had 
a right to post a Supercedeas Bond and withhold performance of 
the Order of the trial court pending appellate review. The 
delivery of the stock certificate makes resolution of that issue 
moot, except as to the money damages for contempt. 
Were the Defendants to have delivered the stock certificate 
to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff would be free to alienate, 
encumber or otherwise transfer and deal with the stock certif-
icate, thereby placing it out of reach of the Defendants should 
they later prevail on appeal. It is the Defendants1 position 
that they had a legal right to withhold delivery of the stock 
certificate and post a Supercedeas Bond and thereby effectually 
comply with the court order. The issue was resolved between the 
parties when the court unilaterally after hearing all of the 
objections and indicating an intent to place the Defendants in 
jail, indicated that it would receive the stock certificate and 
hold it at the court until final resolution of the matter. This 
is the reason why the Defendants had not delivered the stock 
certificate as ordered by the court previously. Given the fact 
that the court indicated a disposition to hold the certificate 
until final resolution of this matter, the Defendants immediately 
delivered the stock certificate to the court. The reason why the 
Defendants resisted became moot when the court indicated that it 
would agree to hold the stock certificate until the matter was 
finally resolved. 
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Nevertheless, the court still held the Defendants in 
contempt for failure to comply with its Order. Given the fact 
that the court itself changed its own Order recognizing that it 
had improperly put the Defendants in a position of not allowing 
them to obtain appellate review or post a Supercedeas Bond, it 
was improper to hold the Defendants liable for contempt of 
court. It was not a refusal to comply with the court's Order, 
but a refusal of the court to deal with the matter in a proper 
and reasonable way. Parenthetically, it ought to be noted that 
the trial court at a later date actually failed to follow its own 
ruling and gave the stock certificate to the Defendant upon the 
conclusion of the jury trial in this matter, knowing full well 
the matter would be appealed. That is, the trial court did not 
allow the Defendants, their appellate review before delivering 
the actual stock certificate to the Plaintiff despite its own 
agreement to do so. At that time the Defendants again requested 
the opportunity to file a Supercedeas Bond prior to delivery of 
the stock certificate, but the court indicated an unwillingness 
to hear any such request. See Trial Transcript at 858-862. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING AND IN THE METHOD 
USED TO DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES 
The trial court entered a Judgment in the amount of 
$15,000.00 against the individual Defendants for Plaintiff's 
attorneys fees. The basis of the award was that the Plaintiff 
had prevailed in its derivative action on behalf of the corp-
oration against these individual Defendants. 
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Initially, the nature of this derivative action should be 
noted. There were only five stockholders of the corporation 
including the Plaintiff based on the Partial Summary Judgment. 
There were the four individual Defendants who for a period of 
time regarded themselves as the only stockholders. Thereafter, 
in 1983 the trial court determined that the Plaintiff was also a 
stockholder. All were involved in this litigation. The 
Plaintiff was suing the other four stockholders and the corpor-
ation. There is no occasion for the Plaintiff to represent 
anyone other than himself because the others are all being 
represented. However, a derivative action allows an attorney to 
seek to have the corporation pay his legal fees for obtaining 
relief for the corporation. The only relief which the Plaintiff 
could get by filing as a derivative action that he could not get 
individually was payment of his attorneys fees. Thus, shortly 
ioefore trial in this matter the Plaintiff amended his Complaint 
to assert a derivative cause of action for * the corporation as 
against the four individual Defendants and remaining stock-
nolders. 
It should be noted that prior to the filing of this 
derivative action there was no demand made on the corporation for 
any redress of any specific act as against the four individuals. 
Indeed, the statutory prerequisite that there be a demand on the 
corporation that it take certain action to protect itself from 
insiders prior to filing a derivative action was not followed in 
the least. This would have put the individuals on notice and 
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the corporation on notice that if some action isn't taken that 
the other individual stockholder will bring an action on behalf 
of the corporation. This notice provides an opportunity for the 
corporation to effectuate its relief and avoid the implementation 
of a derivative cause of action. The Plaintiff wholly failed in 
any form make this demand. This makes the whole basis of the 
derivative action questionable. Defendant duly noted this flaw 
in various motions to the trial court. Trial Transcript at 
842-846. 
The derivative action is also questionable because there is 
no class which is purported to be represented by the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff simply represents himself. Any relief that he 
obtains on behalf of the corporation will inure to the detriment 
of the four Defendants and the benefit of the individual 
Plaintiff who makes the derivative claim. 
The substance of the derivative action was that the 
individual Defendants had depleted the corporation to benefit 
themselves in their private business ventures. That claim was 
joased principally on the fact that the individuals had engaged in 
a real estate transaction using funds which they had borrowed 
from the corporation. The facts indicated and it was proven at 
rrial that what occurred was that the corporation desired to 
relocate it offices in a different location. Trial Transcript at 
The original contract to purchase the ground was made in 
the name of the corporation. However, the individuals who at 
that time believed that they were the only stockholders of the 
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corporation, consulted with their accountant. Their accountant 
advised them that for tax reasons it would be preferable for them 
to buy it as individuals and lease it to the corporation. Trial 
Transcript at 712-715. It should be noted that at this point the 
Plaintiff had ceased to be an employee of the corporation, had 
been paid back his investment in the corporation and had made no 
claim that he was a stockholder. The Defendants were proceeding 
on the belief that they were the only stockholders in the 
company. 
Based on their accountant's advice, the four individuals 
borrowed the money from the corporation and used that money to 
buy the land, paying the corporation a modest interest rate on 
the money borrowed. Trial Transcript at 712-715. 
The derivative action was based upon this transaction, 
alleging that the Defendants had violated the applicable corpor-
ate law by borrowing corporate funds without proper approval from 
all of the stockholders. Obviously, the Defendants were in a 
position of thinking all of the stockholders had approved because 
indeed they thought they were all of the stockholders. The fact 
that in mid-1983 it was determined that the Plaintiff is indeed a 
stockholder, then makes that transaction improper ex post facto. 
This question was submitted to the jury again over Defendants1 
counsels objections that it was indicative of a violation of a 
statute. Nevertheless, the jury found that indeed the individual 
Defendants had borrowed money improperly from the corporation 
because there had been no stockholder approval of the transaction 
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and based on that found that the corporation had been damaged in 
the amount of $81,556.00• The amount of that damage is not on 
issue on appeal. Since the individuals have purchased the 
corporation in the bidding format, that issue is now moot. 
However, it does become relevant because it becomes the basis on 
which there can be an argument that the derivative action 
benefited the corporation. The court in determining whether 
there had been a benefit to the corporation or not determined 
that this $81,556.00 was of benefit to the corporation. 
It should *be noted that the jury was specifically asked 
whether or not the derivative action was of benefit to the 
corporation. The jury's answer was yes and when it was asked to 
determine the amount, the jury indicated that it was unable to 
determine the amount. The Defendants' position is that the 
jury's indication that it was unable to determine the amount does 
not leave room for the court to thereafter determine the amount 
of benefit conferred upon the corporation to be $81,556.00. If 
the jury had felt that was the amount of the benefit, they 
obviously could have determined that amount inasmuch as they are 
the ones that came up with that figure in the beginning. The 
fact that the jury was unable to determine the amount of any 
benefit to the corporation is indicative of a specific finding 
that there was not sufficient evidence on which the jury could 
find the amount of benefit to the corporation. 
Given the jury's specific finding, it is improper for the 
court to determine the benefit to the corporation. Obviously, 
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any benefit in this kind of case is entirely fortuitous. The 
benefit comes from the stockholders of 87.75% of the corpor-
ation. The only one whose position changes is that of the 
Plaintiff. The rest of the owners of the corporation haven't 
benefited from the derivative action in any way. The only real 
benefit that can be assessed here is the benefit to the Plain-
tiff. 
It should be noted that a derivative action has been defined 
as follows: 
An action brought by a stockholder is derivative if the 
gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation or to 
the whole body of its stock or property and not injury to 
the Plaintiff's individual interest as a stockholder. 
19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, Section 528 at page 63. It should be 
noted a that a court will not entertain a derivative suit unless 
it plainly appears that all remedies within the corporation 
itself has been resorted to in vain. Indeed, the general 
treatises note that: 
Before a stockholder may institute a derivative action, he 
must make a demand upon the corporation to commence the 
action, unless such demand would be futile. The rule, as 
expressed or recognized in a number of cases, is that a 
demand on the corporate directors, officers or management to 
JDring suit and their wrongful refusal to do so is necessary 
before a stockholder may maintain a suit in behalf of 
the corporation, in the absence of circumstances excusing 
such demand. 
19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, Section 540. Indeed, in various 
cases, it has been noted that legal fees not awarded in a 
derivative action where the real beneficiary of the action is not 
the corporation, but the stockholder and where the stockholder's 
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own affairs are entertwined with the derivative action. The 
treatises note that: 
Counsel fees will not be allowed a stockholder who 
institutes suit against his corporation which is not for the 
benefit of any stockholder except himself, especially where 
the suit is to the disadvantage of other stockholders. 
i9 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, Section 589 at 113. See also 152 
A.L.R. 920. 
It is generally noted that in determining the amount of 
attorneys fees that should be awarded in a stockholder's 
derivative action, the general rules are applicable. The court 
will consider what sums are reasonable depending on all the facts 
and circumstances in a particular case. The skill, experience 
and the standing of the attorneys and the difficulties of the 
litigation, and the amount of recovery involved. The sum 
recoverable as attorneys fees is not measured by what the 
Plaintiff stockholder has expended, but is limited to the 
reasonable value of the services on behalf of the corporation. 
Although it has been held that it is proper to award a 
shareholder legal fees with respect to his derivative action 
when such action provides a benefit to the corporation, this 
is a permissive power of the Court which should be applied on a 
case by case basis. In the present case, the jury specifically 
found no corporate assets had been misapplied or wasted. In 
addition, they were not able to determine a monetary sum by which 
the corporation had been benefited by Plaintiff's actions. 
Combining those findings with the fact that the Plaintiff's 
derivative action was a last minute effort which failed to 
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follow specific procedural requirements it would be entirely 
appropriate for the Court to award no attorney fees. If attorney 
fees are awarded, Plaintiff is entitled to only those attorney 
fees which specifically relate to the derivative portion of the 
lawsuit. 
This would be in accordance with Rule 23.1 of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (1953) which specifically requires that before 
derivative action be brought by a shareholder that the said 
shareholder make a specific demand on the directors of the 
corporation to correct those acts which the shareholder complains 
of. 
Plaintiff claims such demands were made in Plaintiff's 
original complaint. However, a close reading of said complaint 
reveals that there were no demands made on the Board of Directors 
of the corporation in any manner let alone any request for action 
with the requisite specificity required by the statute. To 
make specific allegations of wrong doing on the part of the 
directors of the corporation in the derivative action only a 
little more than two months before trial is completely contrary 
to the purpose of the requirements in the statute and wholly 
ignores the rights of the directors of the corporation to take 
the corrective measures they are entitled to make. 
It is declared generally that before a stockholder 
may institute a derivative action, he must make a 
demand upon the corporation to commence the action, 
unless such a demand would be futile. The rule, as 
expressed or recognized in a number of cases, is that 
a demand on the corporate directors, officers, or 
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management to bring suit and their wrongful refusal 
to do so is necessary before a stockholder may maintain 
a suit in behalf of the corporation . . . 
19 Am Jur 2d Corporations, Section 541 (Footnotes omitted). 
There is virtually no evidence nor any claim by Plaintiff 
that any demand was made by anyone to correct or to bring suit on 
behalf of the corporation and that such demand was wrongfully 
refused. Nor is there any evidence or claim by Plaintiff that 
such a demand would be futile. The failure of the Plaintiff to 
follow statutory procedures with respect to the derivative action 
requires a reversal of the award of attorneys fees. The timing 
of Plaintiff's amended action and its failure to allow the 
corporate officers and directors to rectify the new complaints of 
the Plaintiff justifies this ruling. 
In addition, the mathematical division which itself was 
erroneous, is an improper way to calculate the eimount of attorn-
eys fees. See Statement of Case, infra. The court failed 
to require an allocation at time between that used to serve the 
Plaintiff as opposed to the corporate party in a derivative 
sense. Further the failure at Plaintiff's counsel to keep 
adequate records for this purpose indicates a denial of attorneys 
fees would be proper. Furthermore, the court failed in it's 
mathematical model to consider the major effort of Plaintiff's 
counsel in proving Plaintiff was a stockholder and the some 
550,000.00 of benefit thereby obtained. If that were inserted 
into the mathematical model, the benefits would be approximately 
50/50. 
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The derivative action was a last minute effort to obtain 
legal fees. The necessary prerequisites were not followed. 
Lastly, the calculation of attorneys fees itself was flawed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's request relief from this Court in the form 
of a reversal of the Partial Summary Judgment on Issues I or II 
hereof. The consequence of that reversal would be a remand for 
retrial on that single issue; whether or not Plaintiff is a 
stockholder. 
If on remand Plaintiff were determined not to be a stock-
holder, the other Issues III, IV and V herein would necessarily 
be moot even were this Court to deny the appeal for other relief, 
as requested in Issues III, IV and V hereof as a consequence of 
Plaintiff not being a stockholder. 
On the other hand, if on remand the Plaintiff were deter-
mined to be a stockholder, then the results of the earlier trial 
not appealed from would be binding, i.e.; the money judgments, 
r>id sale, etc. In that event, Issues III, IV and V would be 
applicable. 
Alternatively, if this Court sustained the trial court's 
Partial Summary Judgment, it will need to reach Issues III, IV 
and V. 
Defendants believes reversal on each of the five issues is 
appropriate. The Court should reaffirm its firm policy against 
Motions for Reconsideration. The trial court erred in categor-
izing the specific clause as a forfeiture rather than a buy-sell 
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agreement. 
Further, there was no denial of proper access to corporate 
records in response to the June 30, 1983 letter. Civil contempt 
did not occur and lastly the imposition of derivative attorneys 
fees was improper and not properly determined. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants request reversal and remand. 
DATED this 9th day of December, 1985. 
DAINES & KANE 
George Daines 
Attorney for Defendant 
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